- Mar 15, 2011
Did I ever say there was no discernable change in altitude? That’s your blatantly incorrect claim, not mine. I was speculating on why there may have been no discernable change in heading inspite of the Captain calling “select heading”.LOL.. you're reduced to semantics now..
Earlier in this thread you insisted that the reason that there was no discernable change in R116’s course or altitude following the Winch Operator’s warning was because aircraft don’t respond immediately to pilot control inputs.. now you’re saying that the change in altitude in the last moments are attributable to pilot control inputs during the last moments.. You’re obviously just making it up as you go along.
You also seem to be confusing Barometric altitude with Radar altitude.. and you say you're a pilot..!
The Radar Altitude dropping off was obviously due to the presence of Blackrock Island below the helicopter, not to any control input from the pilots.
You misunderstand/misrepresent the evidence as laid out in the report and now you misunderstand/misrepresent what I said.
In the post you’re referring to I explained that in order to turn an aircraft you first need to roll in the direction you wish to turn towards....turning involves rotation in the three axes of the aircraft, first about the longitudinal axis (and the lateral axis if the turn is to be a level turn) and then rotation about the vertical axis. That’s the sequence. A change in altitude is a simpler manoeuvre in that it only involves changes about two axes, lateral and vertical and so it is quicker to effect change in direction in that sense. The correct escape manoeuvre in the event of imminent terrain impact is to initially pitch fully back and apply full power and at some point thereafter, as a secondary consideration, establish a turn to avoid the worst of the terrain. That is what seems to have been initiated in the final moments. The report details the parameters recorded by the black box. It shows that prior to impact a number of control inputs were made which resulted in the helicopter pitching up and climbing prior to impact. It also shows a left roll input on the cyclic control stick(but this may just have been in response to the increased torque as the engines powered up....I am not sure about that). You claimed however, that there was “no discernable change in course or altitude of the helicopter during the 10 second time period between his warning and the helicopter’s impact”. The FDR clearly shows that the helicopter climbed from approximately 300’ baro to 350’ baro before impact, it was climbing as the terrain rose up to meet them(hence the rising baro but falling radar altimeter readings. I understand fully the difference between barometric altitude and radar altitude......you obviously do not).
That’s my interpretation of the parameters as detailed in Appendix A of the report.
It’s also the interpretation of the air accident investigators. In their own words, directly from the report.....
...page 6In the final seconds, the helicopter pitched up rapidly, impacted with terrain at the western end of Black Rock and departed from controlled flight.
....page 27The helicopter rapidly pitched nose up during the two seconds prior to the initial impact.
....also page 27.Just as the CVR rear crew channel recorded “Come right now come right COME RIGHT”, the HUMS data showed significant inputs on the cyclic and collective data parameters.