Coast Guard helicopter with four crew missing off west coast

Orbit v2

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Professionals rely on their training - clear precise language - for communication even in stressful situations. They don’t rely on emotion, “tone of voice” etc. There are good reasons for that.

Only someone who has never held a critical position in a professional team could conclude that the winch-man’s “lack of urgency” is somehow to blame.
LOL. It's really all that simple for you lot. You focus on the last ten seconds of the mission and expect the blame to be all there (implying that I was somehow blaming the winchman, which I wasn't, in opposition to you lot blaming the commander).

If it was that simple, then there would be no need for a final report. All the information about the final ten seconds is there in black and white. I'd be fairly confident that the final report will identify a number of issues that came into play long before the final minutes of the mission, and I'd be fairly sure as well that they won't conclude that the commander ignored the winchman, or that much if any blame can be attributed in the final 10-20 seconds of it.
 


Pabilito

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The initial information was not conveyed with the kind of urgency that suggested they were in immediate danger.

The winch operators warning should have instantly alarmed the captain when suddenly presented with conflicting data where the winch operator said there was an obstacle in their flight path and the EGPWS showed no such obstacle.

Conflicting data is the classic red flag warning sign of flawed situational awareness and should have engendered an immediate sense of urgency in itself. However she didn’t pick up on that either and instead of treating the situation as urgent and taking immediate direct manual control in response to the warning and conflicting data, she chose a slow measured response and that was the fatal decision that ultimately led to a crash.
 

Orbit v2

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The winch operators warning should have instantly alarmed the captain when suddenly presented with conflicting data where the winch operator said there was an obstacle in their flight path and the EGPWS showed no such obstacle.
Is that so? Well, the winch operator couldn't tell how far away the obstacle was (Was it something big and far away, or something smaller but much closer?). If he had known, he would have said. It was presumably only the fact that when the image of the island then grew larger in his screen, just like it did later on the co-pilots radar screen, that alerted him to the danger. The EGPWS was the system I referred to earlier which was significantly degraded due to the use of the "low altitude" switch. It's also questionable whether the absence of an obstacle in its database would present a red flag. You may be making the classic mistake of highlighting a significant fact we know now, but the crew certainly didn't know at the time.
Conflicting data is the classic red flag warning sign of flawed situational awareness and should have engendered an immediate sense of urgency in itself. However she didn’t pick up on that either and instead of treating the situation as urgent and taking immediate direct manual control in response to the warning and conflicting data, she chose a slow measured response and that was the fatal decision that ultimately led to a crash.
Well, that's good to know. You should call the AAIU and tell them they can stop the investigation as we have all the answers here on the Internet ...
 

Nebuchadnezzar

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What exactly do you mean by ‘a situation that they shouldn’t have been in’ ?

SAR personnel by definition operate in unplanned emergency situations.. anything can happen and they need to be prepared for unexpected scenarios..and unplanned situations.

Anyway at least you confirm the point I have been making here that they were travelling fast and low. in a low light foggy environment where they were unsure of their exact position.. a point that your friend Biggles denies was a causative factor.
Flying at 200 feet at 70 knots was not a causative factor. It was a contributory factor. It did not in itself cause the crash. The crew were not as you claim unsure of their position. They were unaware of the position of Blackrock. Their unawareness of Blackrock was a causative factor.

Whether flying at 200’ at 70 knots in those conditions was normal procedure is not clear. It may have been standard proceedure per their operations manual......this is still unclear but I expect that it may form a significant part of the next/final report. If so and if such procedure would be considered bad practice by other operators and regulators then IMO CHC Helicopters, the Coastguard and the IAA would all share primary responsibility for the disaster. If it was not part of the operators operations manual but was common custom and practice amongst most crews then CHC Helicopters and the CG would still bear a significant proportion of the responsibility for what happened.

In addition to those factors are the errors and poor quality of the maps and charts that the crew were operating with.
 
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Nebuchadnezzar

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Is that so? Well, the winch operator couldn't tell how far away the obstacle was (Was it something big and far away, or something smaller but much closer?). If he had known, he would have said. It was presumably only the fact that when the image of the island then grew larger in his screen, just like it did later on the co-pilots radar screen, that alerted him to the danger. The EGPWS was the system I referred to earlier which was significantly degraded due to the use of the "low altitude" switch. It's also questionable whether the absence of an obstacle in its database would present a red flag. You may be making the classic mistake of highlighting a significant fact we know now, but the crew certainly didn't know at the time.

Well, that's good to know. You should call the AAIU and tell them they can stop the investigation as we have all the answers here on the Internet ...
Such a shame Pablito and his compadres(Dedogs and Eoin C) weren’t available on that night to fly the mission.
 

Sweet Darling

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There isn't really. As the transcript shows: by the time the situation became clear to the crew member in the rear that they were in serious danger, it was too late. It's there in black and white. The initial information was not conveyed with the kind of urgency that suggested they were in immediate danger.

One curious aspect though is the chain of command. From this stand point it seems odd that the information was passed to the commander who then passed the request to change course to the co-pilot. Clearly, that caused a delay and I suspect this will covered in the report, but maybe it was standard procedure. It's certainly premature to blame it on the commander.
He warned her before they were in immediate danger.
She knew the area as she had made that approach in the past.
First rule when flying blind. Your instruments know best.
 

Sweet Darling

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LOL. It's really all that simple for you lot. You focus on the last ten seconds of the mission and expect the blame to be all there (implying that I was somehow blaming the winchman, which I wasn't, in opposition to you lot blaming the commander).

If it was that simple, then there would be no need for a final report. All the information about the final ten seconds is there in black and white. I'd be fairly confident that the final report will identify a number of issues that came into play long before the final minutes of the mission, and I'd be fairly sure as well that they won't conclude that the commander ignored the winchman, or that much if any blame can be attributed in the final 10-20 seconds of it.
The report will go back to accepting the mission.
 

Nebuchadnezzar

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He warned her before they were in immediate danger.
She knew the area as she had made that approach in the past.
First rule when flying blind. Your instruments know best.
Except sometimes they don’t.
 

Pabilito

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Such a shame Pablito and his compadres(Dedogs and Eoin C) weren’t available on that night to fly the mission.

Yes we must all genuflect to your status as a pilot.. doing what the engineers and scientists who designed the aircraft that you fly told you what to do to keep it airborne.

Your arrogance hasn’t gone unnoticed here., as if the only people qualified to comment on an air accident are pilots and their orbiting fan boys.
 

Eoin Coir

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Yes we must all genuflect to your status as a pilot.. doing what the engineers and scientists who designed the aircraft that you fly told you what to do to keep it airborne.

Your arrogance hasn’t gone unnoticed here., as if the only people qualified to comment on an air accident are pilots and their orbiting fan boys.
Is it not a fact that about 80 % of crashes are due to pilot error?
 

Pabilito

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Is that so? Well, the winch operator couldn't tell how far away the obstacle was (Was it something big and far away, or something smaller but much closer?). If he had known, he would have said. It was presumably only the fact that when the image of the island then grew larger in his screen, just like it did later on the co-pilots radar screen, that alerted him to the danger. The EGPWS was the system I referred to earlier which was significantly degraded due to the use of the "low altitude" switch. It's also questionable whether the absence of an obstacle in its database would present a red flag. You may be making the classic mistake of highlighting a significant fact we know now, but the crew certainly didn't know at the time.

Well, that's good to know. You should call the AAIU and tell them they can stop the investigation as we have all the answers here on the Internet ...

There was an obstacle dead ahead in the flightpath which the winch operator identified 10 seconds before they crashed into it.. there was adequate time to slow down, circle or circumnavigate but instead the commander chose to plough on at same speed straight ahead and crash a perfectly good helicopter into terrain that had been identified as an obstacle in the flight path.
 

Pabilito

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He warned her before they were in immediate danger.
She knew the area as she had made that approach in the past.
First rule when flying blind. Your instruments know best.

EGPWS is not an instrument in the classical analogue sense.. classical instruments utilise purely physical phenomena such as light and heat whereas a digital virtual reality instrument such as an EGPWS utilises digital database data to render a virtual reality.
 

Pabilito

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Flying at 200 feet at 70 knots was not a causative factor. It was a contributory factor. It did not in itself cause the crash.
It was 90+ knots

The crew were not as you claim unsure of their position. They were unaware of the position of Blackrock. Their unawareness of Blackrock was a causative factor.
Their unawareness of the height of Blackrock rather than it's position was the real problem


Whether flying at 200’ at 70 knots in those conditions was normal procedure is not clear. It may have been standard proceedure per their operations manual......this is still unclear but I expect that it may form a significant part of the next/final report. If so and if such procedure would be considered bad practice by other operators and regulators then IMO CHC Helicopters, the Coastguard and the IAA would all share primary responsibility for the disaster. If it was not part of the operators operations manual but was common custom and practice amongst most crews then CHC Helicopters and the CG would still bear a significant proportion of the responsibility for what happened.
They were apparently flying through fog..different conditions..

In addition to those factors are the errors and poor quality of the maps and charts that the crew were operating with.
Yes I'm still waiting to see page 2 of the BLACKMO flight plan where it apparently states the height of Blackrock.. it's not clear if page 2 was on R116
 
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Dedogs

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So where do you think she was? Was she down the back doing her make up 🙄

It’s amazing what you can learn from some bloke down the pub. Do you drink in the same pub as your fellow idiot Dedogs?
hed be fairly dry if he was drinkin with me theese days mate.... were after gettin the morgage and the house is started so beer moneys fierce short for awhile.... :( :( :( ;)
 

Dedogs

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All of the above is a complete fantasy. The following is the transcript from the preliminary report, showing what happened:

Rear crew channel: K...looking at an island just in, directly ahead of us now guys, you want to come right [Commander’s Name]

Commander: OK, come right just confirm?

Rear crew channel: About...twenty degrees right yeah

Commander: OK Come Right...select heading

Commander: Select heading

Co-pilot: Roger...Heading selected

Rear crew channel: Come right now come right COME RIGHT

Co-pilot: [Expletive]OOOHHHH[Expletive] We're gone.


Whatever mistakes were made before they got to this point, and no reasonable person would expect a crew who had no idea what they were getting into, would have recovered from this point. At least, it would have required a different configuration of the instruments, of the crew, and probably a good bit of luck.
in fairness mate its the captains job to know what theyre gettin into!!!!! if she turned right when the winchman said turn right they would of never crashed....
 


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