Have we learned nothing then?There are people in high places - politicians, civil servants, regulators, bankers - who have failed in the exercise of their duties, that have led us to where we are now. Similarly, there are people in not so high places - civil servants, regulators, bankers, political advisors - who also failed. They were negligent, incompetent, undertrained, poorly led, badly advised, call it what you will - they made mistakes.
This is true in this instance (I don't see how it cannot be - either the test was flawed, in which case the framers of the test, presumably European Civil Servants, failed; or the execution of the test was flawed; or the bankers didn't provide the right information, for whatever reason. It is also true in so many of the other processes that have led us to this unfortunate place.
In very few of these cases I would submit people deliberately did wrong. In my view, I think most people would agree with that. By extension therefore, most people were simply trying to do their jobs. That will have resulted in cover-ups, airbrushing, and the denial of "access to the truth" in the interests of those people who made mistakes. There's nothing criminal here, it's just the way things work. So the answer to your question is simply "no".
Right...re: back to normal? Yes. It's what Fintan O'Toole's been writing about in the IT for some time that the crime here is not what happened, but that all our planning for recovery envisages a future where everything was just like it was before - i.e. a ticking bomb.Have we learned nothing then?
Will it all drift back to "business as usual"?
If those minions who covered up their bosses corruption lived in danger of getting their arses severely roasted then perhaps we could build a platform from which we could move forward.
If that proves to be impossible perhaps we should abandon the whole structure.
I cannot accept that it's that simple. The principles of sound underwriting have been established for many a year. If there was, for example, a requirement for a maximum mortgage amount of 2.5 times salary in existence, why was this in existence? I suggest it was based on prudent lending principles, perhaps backed up by some actuarial work.But in truth, it's mostly about mistakes and human error, judgement calls that were well intended but wrong.
Targets and ego play a big part in my opinion.I cannot accept that it's that simple. The principles of sound underwriting have been established for many a year. If there was, for example, a requirement for a maximum mortgage amount of 2.5 times salary in existence, why was this in existence? I suggest it was based on prudent lending principles, perhaps backed up by some actuarial work.
I know the rating principles behind insurance practices better and this is how the London operation of the Insurance Corporation of Ireland caused so much grief 25 years ago, by abandoning same.
On a commercial lending basis, there seems to have been similarly lax practices creeping in; land title documentation not complete, etcetera
So we need to ask why were long established practices apparently discarded? I'm not a fan of the well intended but wrong idea. I am a fan of the "greed" excuse whereby bonuses and perks were paid based on "profits" stated. Cheap money was obtained, shovelled into the market, mortgages repackaged and sold into the secondary market.
Now we're getting this Milgram experiment "I wuz only following orders, guv" which, quite frankly, is fine at a certain level within the bank, the enlisted personnel. But the big bonus takers, the officer corps, knew exactly how it would all end if you ignored standard banking practice, and not in that bullsh1t soft landing either