Lloyd George's sympathy towards Hitler.

owedtojoy

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How would Europe's borders look like if Germany had won the Second World War? - Quora
I don't think they could have succeeded in the long term in maintaining control over such a vast territory, but it's plausible that they could have maintained control over a small number of neighboring countries and a sizable proportion of Africa: How would Europe's borders look like if Germany had won the Second World War. What I find strangest of all is how Germany was so small in comparison to the territory it colonized. Russia was always going to suck it in and blow it out in bubbles. It should have been obvious.
Hitler always pointed to India, where about 100,000 Britishers ruled over millions of Indians, with the help of their Indian Army. Hitler did not realise that self-Government for India was very much a live issue in British politics.

However, he did have a plan for drastic depopulation of Belarus and Ukraine, simply by commandeering all the food and letting the population starve to death. These plans were made, but never implemented, because the Nazis found they needed the "native" population as slave labourers in their own countries, and in Germany itself. The Nazis were surprisingly loath to mobilise women into the national workforce - much less so than the British or the Soviets in their respective countries.



The best book about the Nazi trade-offs between murdering Jews, letting Slavs starve to death, and the needs of the German War Economy is in Adam Tooze's The Wages of Destruction.
 


owedtojoy

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I read a bio about Hitler written by a guy called John Toland, iirc, and one of the things I found intriguing was the absence of one of his grandparents from his birth cert, as considering the Nazi's required members to prove their pedigree as far back as the 17th century, that suggests Hitler himself didn't subscribe to the core fundamental tenets of the Nazi ideology.
Hitler was a virulent anti-semite, the overwhelming evidence of everything he did and said in regard to Jews proves that e.g. his recorded demands in 1944 that Hungary deport Jews to Auschwitz.

Fake revisionists (like David Irving) have tried to exculpate him, but mostly they have been exposed as anti-semites themselves.
 

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2,000 bhlian de stair tughta sios o glúin go ghlúin, Sassanach
Strange, almost Anglic, sentence order there. Wouldn't have got that past my Leaving Cert Irish teacher at the High School, who would also have insisted on dhá mhíle.

Oh, and once again, I went overnight from being a D4 'West Brit' to generic 'mad Irish' by taking the Mail Boat. But sassanach?

Toland on Hitler is more easy-reading, a creditable effort — but from the 1970s (and now thoroughly dated, especially since Volker Ullrich). Toland tends to the narrative and anecdotal — whereas Kershaw (which I find a chore) and Ulrich are analytical. I find it hard to forgive Toland for his nonsense about FDR's alleged complicity over Pearl Harbor.
 

Antóin Mac Comháin

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The pictures of the Soviet prisoners are horrific. Shooting them would have been more humane. The size and scale of Generalplan Ost is hard to take in. Thanks for the tip with The Wages of Destruction. I'l stick it on the to-read-before-I-die list and hopefully I'll get around to reading it at some stage.
 

owedtojoy

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Strange, almost Anglic, sentence order there. Wouldn't have got that past my Leaving Cert Irish teacher at the High School, who would also have insisted on dhá mhíle.

Oh, and once again, I went overnight from being a D4 'West Brit' to generic 'mad Irish' by taking the Mail Boat. But sassanach?

Toland on Hitler is more easy-reading, a creditable effort — but from the 1970s (and now thoroughly dated, especially since Volker Ullrich). Toland tends to the narrative and anecdotal — whereas Kershaw (which I find a chore) and Ulrich are analytical. I find it hard to forgive Toland for his nonsense about FDR's alleged complicity over Pearl Harbor.
After Ian Keegan's weighty tomes (2 volumes) on Hitler, now the German historian Peter Longerich has published another biography, just arriving in the shops this week.


I saw at the weekend Bernard Simms has added another biography to the pile.


I suppose if there is a biography for this generation, it may be Longerich's.
 

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It seems to have gotten mostly 4/5 star ratings, but I think I'll give it a swerve because I don't know enough about the topic to determine for myself if its conspiracy loon stuff. Broken clocks being right twice a day, I'll take your advice this time.
Obviously we each recall different reviews. All I suggest is Antóin Mac Comháin lists any subsequent (and credible) historians who have vindicated Toland.

Allow an off-topic on this one (because it's quite important). Toland's The Rising Sun (1970) had FDR, Secretary-of-State Stimson, Secretary-of-the-Navy Knox, and (as then) Chief-of-Staff George Marshall all complicit in fore-knowledge of the imminent Japanese assault. The cover-up involved scapegoating General Short and Admiral Kimmel (and, yes, someone had to carry the can, not entirely fairly). Kimmel swallowed the Toland notion, as part of his recriminations and attempt at exoneration. Nor should we forget, again as self-embrocation, how Macarthur had previously denigrated the late FDR in a similar spirit.

In 1981 along came Gordon W. Prange's At Dawn We Slept (see especially page 1216) to do the forensics. In the same year Ronald Lewin published The American Magic (see especially page 1504), which deals exhaustively with US code-breaking of the Japanese ciphers.
 

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Obviously we each recall different reviews. All I suggest is Antóin Mac Comháin lists any subsequent (and credible) historians who have vindicated Toland.

Allow an off-topic on this one (because it's quite important). Toland's The Rising Sun (1970) had FDR, Secretary-of-State Stimson, Secretary-of-the-Navy Knox, and (as then) Chief-of-Staff George Marshall all complicit in fore-knowledge of the imminent Japanese assault. The cover-up involved scapegoating General Short and Admiral Kimmel (and, yes, someone had to carry the can, not entirely fairly). Kimmel swallowed the Toland notion, as part of his recriminations and attempt at exoneration. Nor should we forget, again as self-embrocation, how Macarthur had previously denigrated the late FDR in a similar spirit.

In 1981 along came Gordon W. Prange's At Dawn We Slept (see especially page 1216) to do the forensics. In the same year Ronald Lewin published The American Magic (see especially page 1504), which deals exhaustively with US code-breaking of the Japanese ciphers.
I read Toland years ago, and thought it was ok at the time. I suggest it has been superseded by other books like Ronald Spector's Eagle Against the Sun.

That calumny about FDR's advanced knowledge of Pearl Harbour still crops up as a favoured conspiracy theory of the loony right. Even Gore Vidal subscribed to it at one stage.
 

Antóin Mac Comháin

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Obviously we each recall different reviews. All I suggest is Antóin Mac Comháin lists any subsequent (and credible) historians who have vindicated Toland.
The reviews I was referring to are from your link:

One of the reviewers said that 'While Toland does write interestingly, this is another case of revisionist history', and went on to say the he wasn't 'interested in finishing it', but gave the book a 3-star rating. The same guy gave At Dawn We Slept a 4-star rating. Another reviewer who read both, rated them exactly the same. He says that 'Prange argues against the Beard Thesis and exonerates FDR', but then goes on to claim that 'Toland was a bit tedious' but in 'so doing, he amasses a heck of a lot of detail in order to be convincing', and on the strength of that his 'arguments are therefore strong', which I think contradicts his claim about the Prange book, but that received rave reviews and nearly half of them are 5-stars, so I'll keep my eyes peeled for that one..
 

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Now, here's a funny thing. And it's actually back 'on topic'.

I was skimming Kershaw's effort on Lord Londonderry, and on page 275 I came across :
The guarantee had effectively (if still not altogether in Chamberlain's mind) killed off appeasement. It had cleared the path which, five months later, would end in war. It had in essence left the decision on whether Britain would become involved in war to the outcome of relations between two other countries, Germany and Poland. And, with the Soviet Union left out of the arrangement, it amounted, as David Lloyd George reminded the House of Commons during the debate on the guarantee, on 3 April [1939], to 'a frightful gamble'.
That's it. It's cited (page 432) to Parker (page 218) and Taylor (page 544). Those who read history books, rather than mere 'reviews', will be spotting the problem. Why didn't Kershaw cite the primary source, the text of Hansard?

So I looked it up (as anyone else may, from that hot-link). LG immediately followed WSC having a characteristic half-hour rant (columns 2496-2505). LG in essence repeated WSC's approach, acknowledging the Chamberlain government was moving away from appeasement, but severely questioning Britain's ability to deliver:
Herr Hitler's speech on Saturday, in my judgment, was a very sinister one. His speech before he marched on Czecho-Slovakia was a very moderate one. It gave no indication in the least of what he was prepared to do. Suppose he does march into Poland, then this pledge of ours comes immediately into operation. Let the House calmly examine that position. We are responsible for the people we represent in respect of these commitments, and the carrying of them out. We cannot go back again upon the pledge we have given. The whole world would mock at us if we did.
Britain has been admired, Britain has been respected, Britain has been hated and Britain has been feared, but she has never been laughed at. It is essential that, having given this solemn pledge, with the assent practically of the whole people of this country, and of France, it is vital that we should carry it out. Let us see what it means. It means that if Hitler marches his armies into Polish territory, with a view to annexing it to his own Dominions, as he did in Czecho-Slovakia, we shall march. France will march, and we shall march with her. March, with what force?

He started with four perceptive generalities:
  • Signor Mussolini in my judgment will not prove unfaithful to the Axis. Nobody knows what arrangements he has with Herr Hitler. A war of this kind will just suit him; it will give him his opportunity, when France is engaged with Germany.
  • The second assumption is that General Franco will betray allies who alone made victory possible. I do not believe it.
  • The third assumption is that the Mediterranean will be as open to us as a roadway as it was in the War of 1914–18, that the Straits will be open, and that the narrows at Pantelleria will be open.
  • The fourth assumption was one to which the Prime Minister rather committed himself and I was rather sorry to hear him; that if Poland gets into trouble we are unable to reach and help her but that Russia would. It is an assumption that Russia will come in sooner or later. I will give at once my definite suggestion to the Government and to the House, and I urge it upon them. If we are going in without the help of Russia we are walking into a trap. It is the only country whose armies can get there.
Whatever LG may have said about Hitler while he was under the Berghof spell, he had been thoroughly disillusioned by the time he made that speech. Late in the day, but credit where it's due.
 

Antóin Mac Comháin

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The notion that anti-semitism can be neatly bisected before/after 1900 or 1918 is self-deluding, or just plain nuts.
1530 England and Wales – Expulsion of Gypsies ordered. Henry VIII forbids the transportation of Gypsies into England

1544 England – Gypsies deported to Norway

1562 England – Provision of previous Acts widened to include people who live and travel like Gypsies - Timeline of Romany Gypsy History in Britain
Persecution of Roma (Gypsies) in Prewar Germany, 1933–1939

'The police in Bavaria, Germany, maintained a central registry of Roma as early as 1899, and later established a commission to coordinate police action against Roma in Munich. In 1933, police in Germany began more rigorous enforcement of pre-Nazi legislation against those who followed a lifestyle labeled "Gypsy." Roma in Germany had been Christian for centuries, so ecclesiastical records were useless in determining Romani descent. The Nazis turned to racial hygiene and sought to determine who was Romani based on physical characteristics.'

'Husseini has been described by the American Jewish Congress as "Hitler's henchman" and some scholars, such as Schwanitz and Rubin, have argued that Husseini made the Final Solution inevitable by shutting out the possibility of Jews escaping to Palestine... the British head of Palestine's Criminal Investigation Division told an American military attaché that the Mufti might be the only person who could unite the Palestinian Arabs..' - Amin al-Husseini
The Nazi's -> GrandMufti -> John Bagot Glubb -> Arab Legion

Not necessarily, particularly if you have a Jewish or Roma-centric pov.
 
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Antóin Mac Comháin

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..one of the things I found intriguing was the absence of one of his grandparents from his birth cert, as considering the Nazi's required members to prove their pedigree as far back as the 17th century, that suggests Hitler himself didn't subscribe to the core fundamental tenets of the Nazi ideology..
Obviously we each recall different reviews. All I suggest is Antóin Mac Comháin lists any subsequent (and credible) historians who have vindicated Toland.

It then, inevitably sweeps up the usual detritus: the Nazi apologists, the Jew-baiters, the sheer ignorant. Makes me wonder what the 'other', lesser history books amounted to.

Vindicate: clear (someone) of blame or suspicion; show or prove to be right, reasonable, or justified.

A birth certificate is a birth certificate, and I'm not quite sure how it can be 'vindicated.'

Hitler was a virulent anti-semite, the overwhelming evidence of everything he did and said in regard to Jews proves that e.g. his recorded demands in 1944 that Hungary deport Jews to Auschwitz.

Fake revisionists (like David Irving) have tried to exculpate him, but mostly they have been exposed as anti-semites themselves.
I'm not in any doubt about Hitler being an anti-Semite. There's a Family Tree in Deep Are The Roots, the opening chapter of Tolands book, which claims that Hitlers Paternal Grandfather was 'Unknown', and proposes that it could be either one of two brothers, Johann Georg Hiedler, Johann Nepomuk Hiedler, 'or a Jew from Graz named Frankenberger or Frankenreither.'

I wasn't aware that the Family Tree was a forgery, or that Toland fabricated history for whatever reason.

Similar terrible events probably happened in Belarus, Russia, Poland and the Baltic States, leading to the flight of many Jews westward..
Although it's going back a bit further, the bulk of the Jews who settled in Ireland arrived in the 1880's, fleeing from pogroms in Lithuania, and most of them settled in and around the Liberties. Their experience in Dublin from that period to Post-WW-II Ireland is recounted in a Dublin Tenement Life: An Oral History, and it goes completely against the grain of what was taking place elsewhere. The overwhelming majority of the Irish Citizen Army lived within a stones throw of Mushatts and the Synagogue off Kevins Street and the area was also the beating heart of the Anti-Treaty IRA during the Classical Civil War period. There wasn't a single incident of anti-Semitism recorded in the area between the late 19th century and the late 20th century, so I think it's fair to say that Dan Breen had no influence on the social life of the people of the Liberties. During the same period in Lithuania pogroms were also carried out against the Gypsies and the Roma, which are described on Pages 180-182 of The Holocaust's Ghost. There's an extract from a periodical in the 1830's of a quote by a Minster of the Church in which the Roma are described as 'insects', and there's also a detailed account of a witch-hunt which resulted in an estimated 260 deaths. Somewhat ironically, during the same period in Scandinavia some of the Uí Néill of the Ulaid fell victim to the process of Norwegianization, as described in the The Great Ocean of Knowledge. In 1997 the King of Norway apologized for the miss-treatment of the Sami people, giving formal recognition to the process.
 
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Antóin Mac Comháin

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Strange, almost Anglic, sentence order there. Wouldn't have got that past my Leaving Cert Irish teacher at the High School, who would also have insisted on dhá mhíle.
You wouldn't have learned the history I learned before I went to school, by the time you done your Leaving Cert in Secondary School. Most of my teachers were from the West of Ireland, which money couldn't buy, but my gran was a better history teacher than all of them combined. I went to a Gaelic-speaking school and my gran was married to the brother of a uni professor of history, and he recognized the difference in quality, and everyone who lived west of Stephens Green had a granny like that.
 

owedtojoy

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Now, here's a funny thing. And it's actually back 'on topic'.

I was skimming Kershaw's effort on Lord Londonderry, and on page 275 I came across :
The guarantee had effectively (if still not altogether in Chamberlain's mind) killed off appeasement. It had cleared the path which, five months later, would end in war. It had in essence left the decision on whether Britain would become involved in war to the outcome of relations between two other countries, Germany and Poland. And, with the Soviet Union left out of the arrangement, it amounted, as David Lloyd George reminded the House of Commons during the debate on the guarantee, on 3 April [1939], to 'a frightful gamble'.
That's it. It's cited (page 432) to Parker (page 218) and Taylor (page 544). Those who read history books, rather than mere 'reviews', will be spotting the problem. Why didn't Kershaw cite the primary source, the text of Hansard?

So I looked it up (as anyone else may, from that hot-link). LG immediately followed WSC having a characteristic half-hour rant (columns 2496-2505). LG in essence repeated WSC's approach, acknowledging the Chamberlain government was moving away from appeasement, but severely questioning Britain's ability to deliver:
Herr Hitler's speech on Saturday, in my judgment, was a very sinister one. His speech before he marched on Czecho-Slovakia was a very moderate one. It gave no indication in the least of what he was prepared to do. Suppose he does march into Poland, then this pledge of ours comes immediately into operation. Let the House calmly examine that position. We are responsible for the people we represent in respect of these commitments, and the carrying of them out. We cannot go back again upon the pledge we have given. The whole world would mock at us if we did.
Britain has been admired, Britain has been respected, Britain has been hated and Britain has been feared, but she has never been laughed at. It is essential that, having given this solemn pledge, with the assent practically of the whole people of this country, and of France, it is vital that we should carry it out. Let us see what it means. It means that if Hitler marches his armies into Polish territory, with a view to annexing it to his own Dominions, as he did in Czecho-Slovakia, we shall march. France will march, and we shall march with her. March, with what force?

He started with four perceptive generalities:
  • Signor Mussolini in my judgment will not prove unfaithful to the Axis. Nobody knows what arrangements he has with Herr Hitler. A war of this kind will just suit him; it will give him his opportunity, when France is engaged with Germany.
  • The second assumption is that General Franco will betray allies who alone made victory possible. I do not believe it.
  • The third assumption is that the Mediterranean will be as open to us as a roadway as it was in the War of 1914–18, that the Straits will be open, and that the narrows at Pantelleria will be open.
  • The fourth assumption was one to which the Prime Minister rather committed himself and I was rather sorry to hear him; that if Poland gets into trouble we are unable to reach and help her but that Russia would. It is an assumption that Russia will come in sooner or later. I will give at once my definite suggestion to the Government and to the House, and I urge it upon them. If we are going in without the help of Russia we are walking into a trap. It is the only country whose armies can get there.
Whatever LG may have said about Hitler while he was under the Berghof spell, he had been thoroughly disillusioned by the time he made that speech. Late in the day, but credit where it's due.
That being said, Lloyd George was downright defeatist in May 1940, wanted to sue for peace, and thought that Churchill's Government would collapse. As we know, he was nearly right, as dramatically recounted in the film Finest Hour.

Churchill invited him to join the Cabinet (twice, I think) - possibly thinking of how he owed Lloyd George for bringing him back from political exile and making him Minister of Munitions in 1917. It was also a case of "Keep your friends close, but your enemies closer". Lloyd George refused.
 

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Churchill invited him [LG] to join the Cabinet (twice, I think) - possibly thinking of how he owed Lloyd George for bringing him back from political exile and making him Minister of Munitions in 1917. It was also a case of "Keep your friends close, but your enemies closer". Lloyd George refused.
Deserves a bit of puzzling over.

As I recall, the post WSC offered was Minister of Agriculture — which smacks of being a near-insult. Furthermore, LG by that stage was thoroughly distrusted by all-comers — seen as pro-German (this thread largely confirms) but with animus against Chamberlain.

So the token Liberal in the WSC government was Archie Sinclair, who had a long track-record of closeness to WSC, dating back to 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers in 1916. Sinclair was landed with the Air Ministry, which must have been a bit of a sine-cure while Beaverbrook was i/c aircraft production, and 'Bomber' Harris delivering the h/e. It did, however, mean that Sinclair deserved the opprobrium for supporting Harris (while there are clues that WSC had qualms).
 

Degeneration X

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During the 1930s, David Lloyd George, who was British PM from December 1916 to October 1922, was openly sympathetic towards Hitler.

Considering that the Nazis hated liberal politicians, why did Lloyd George, who was a former leader of the British Liberal Party, have so much time for Hitler? It doesn't make sense.
Basically, Hitler was a big admirer of DLG's speeches and oratorical skills and DLG was in turn immensely flattered by Hitler's fawning over him.

Interestingly Hitler always talked of how he loved the speeches of this "Englishman" DLG was of course, Welsh.
 

Degeneration X

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Hitler always pointed to India, where about 100,000 Britishers ruled over millions of Indians, with the help of their Indian Army. Hitler did not realise that self-Government for India was very much a live issue in British politics.

However, he did have a plan for drastic depopulation of Belarus and Ukraine, simply by commandeering all the food and letting the population starve to death. These plans were made, but never implemented, because the Nazis found they needed the "native" population as slave labourers in their own countries, and in Germany itself. The Nazis were surprisingly loath to mobilise women into the national workforce - much less so than the British or the Soviets in their respective countries.



The best book about the Nazi trade-offs between murdering Jews, letting Slavs starve to death, and the needs of the German War Economy is in Adam Tooze's The Wages of Destruction.
It's a good read but as Kershaw has pointed out Tooze massively downplays Speer's achievements in keeping the Germans fighting as long as they did.
 

Degeneration X

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How would Europe's borders look like if Germany had won the Second World War? - Quora
I don't think they could have succeeded in the long term in maintaining control over such a vast territory, but it's plausible that they could have maintained control over a small number of neighboring countries and a sizable proportion of Africa: How would Europe's borders look like if Germany had won the Second World War. What I find strangest of all is how Germany was so small in comparison to the territory it colonized. Russia was always going to suck it in and blow it out in bubbles. It should have been obvious.



I read a bio about Hitler written by a guy called John Toland, iirc, and one of the things I found intriguing was the absence of one of his grandparents from his birth cert, as considering the Nazi's required members to prove their pedigree as far back as the 17th century, that suggests Hitler himself didn't subscribe to the core fundamental tenets of the Nazi ideology.



The author of the book, William Craig, is coming from the same tradition as Seosamh Mac Grianna, Seamas Ó Duibhir, Séafra Ó Donnchadha, Seán Ó Conaill, Dáibhí Ó Brudair, Ailidh Dall and Margaret Bennett, and he names his sources in the Prologue, but I don't think anyone's in any doubt that Stalingrad took place. I'll take a guilty plea on easy reading. Next time: Mila 18 was one of the best novels I've ever read. Whatever. Life's too short, and it's really not that important to me.
Counterfactuals make interesting SF books but add very little to historical debate. What would Europe have looked like if the Germans had won WWII? - whatever you want it to look like.
 

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It's a good read but as Kershaw has pointed out Tooze massively downplays Speer's achievements in keeping the Germans fighting as long as they did.
Indeed. And Tooze is, primarily, an economic historian.

[Off topic] The more 'political' Kershaw is at his best (pages 77-83) in his balanced summary of Speer:
The long-running dispute over scarce manpower was regarded by Speer as a major drain on his energy and resources. Despite this, he made extraordinary efforts in the wake of the setbacks in the west to enable Germany to fight on.
The high point of armaments production for the entire war had been reached in July 1944. The level attained, however, flattered to deceive. It has aptly been described as being like the last sprint of the marathon runner before he sags, energy expended. [...]
Without Speer’s extraordinarily strenuous efforts to sustain armaments production and organize the repeated rapid repair of railway lines and bridges destroyed in bombing, the war would have surely been over earlier. He later gave the impression that he viewed the continuation of the war as senseless from the time of the Allied invasion, and that by September it was a ‘hopeless situation’. In recognition of this, everything he did, according to his subsequent account, was directed at preventing the destruction of German industry. Doubtless, this was indeed one objective. Speer had at least one eye on a Germany after Hitler (in which, probably, he hoped to play some significant part). Germany would need her industry, and in his emphasis on immobilization rather than destruction, Speer was naturally working in full agreement with leading industrialists, who, unsurprisingly, combined an all-out effort to manufacture armaments with thoughts, not to be aired in public, of survival after defeat. [...]
Of course, it was far from Speer alone. He presided over a huge empire, run by an immense bureaucratic machine – 70,000-strong in early 1943. He had highly able heads of his ministerial departments and ruthless lieutenants in Xaver Dorsch and Karl Otto Saur (increasingly his arch-rival for Hitler’s favour). Saur himself, said after the war to have ruled by fear and to have treated his staff – as well as his workforce – brutally, was not yet at the point where he accepted the war was lost. At the intersection of the military and industry, Speer had the closest connections with Germany’s leading industrialists, keen to preserve their factories, but also still to maximize production for the war effort. And he was backed by the enforcement agencies of the Party, the police, the prison service and justice administration – tens of thousands of prisoners had by now been put to work in armaments – as well as being supplied by Fritz Sauckel, the crude and brutal Reich Plenipotentiary for Labour, with the legions of foreign workers who slaved in armaments factories in near indescribable conditions. But Speer’s initiative, dynamism and drive were the indispensable component that made the ramshackle armaments empire function as well as it did. His personal ambition and determination not to lose his own power-base meant that he was personally not ready to capitulate. He remained prepared to use his remarkable energies to fend off attempted inroads into his empire by Goebbels, Bormann and the Gauleiter, playing on the support from Hitler that he never entirely lost. And, of course, he showed no scruples in the utterly inhumane treatment of hundreds of thousands of foreign workers, forced to slave to enable the Reich to continue fighting long after reason dictated that the war should be ended.

Richard J Evans, in his review and comment for the LRB, adds to that the Führerprinzip and charisma:
‘Even in the last weeks,’ Kershaw notes, ‘some went in to see him demoralised and disconsolate and came away with new enthusiasm and determination.’ Albert Speer, for instance, whose efforts had done so much in the final three years of the war to increase arms production and keep it going in the face of Allied bombing raids, continued to serve Hitler even though he realised more clearly than most that all was lost.
 
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