TEDtalk: E-voting

bprob

Well-known member
Joined
Jun 8, 2009
Messages
678
i know i could be about to unleash hell by starting a thread on e-voting, but here it goes!!
i just watched a TEDtalk about e-voting, given by David Bismark[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=izddjAp_N4I"]TEDtalk about e-voting[/ame]

David Bismark demos a new system for voting that contains a simple, verifiable way to prevent fraud and miscounting -- while keeping each person's vote secret.
if you want to go straight to the explanation of his method click here(about 3:20 into the talk)
he has a blog post on the matter here
and the developer's website is here

i am not a computer security expert, but it seems to me that having a paper receipt that is verifiable online would address many of the issues that dogged the previous awful attempts at e-voting here.

the advantage of having a receipt that is meaningless to everyone else is that you can lose the receipt and the finder will still be clueless about how you voted

the issue of someone tracking the login when you go online to check your vote is counted was a concern of mine, but seems to have been addressed in the blog comments section
 
Last edited:


bprob

Well-known member
Joined
Jun 8, 2009
Messages
678
[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wqAtuXffrSY&feature=player_embedded"]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wqAtuXffrSY&feature=player_embedded[/ame]

i don't quite get what the first stage, "auditing the ballot" is about. i think it is at the voter's discretion, if they want to satisfy themselves that there is no fraud allocating different candidate names to different positions on the ballot paper?
 

hmmm

Well-known member
Joined
Oct 4, 2006
Messages
2,831
From his talk I still see a problem. You get a receipt printed, but you still have no idea whether the receipt shows the actual vote that has been recorded. It's just as easy to get a machine to record one vote and print a receipt for another, it's also just as easy for this to be displayed online. Talk of using cryptography is all very well, but cryptographers often have their heads up their mathematical asses by assuming that their maths can defeat the types of real world attacks that are possible. In this case, someone who disables or interferes with the crypto chip can then get free reign on the machine.

The simplest solutions are those where a printed copy of your vote is displayed, and when you press "accept" or "vote", the vote is recorded electronically and the printed copy of the vote is stored in a secure container. Should there ever be a query about the votes recorded electronically, the printed votes can be tallied by hand.
 

FrankSpeaks

Well-known member
Joined
Apr 18, 2008
Messages
4,573
This looks to be a very good system.
 

bprob

Well-known member
Joined
Jun 8, 2009
Messages
678
From his talk I still see a problem. You get a receipt printed, but you still have no idea whether the receipt shows the actual vote that has been recorded. It's just as easy to get a machine to record one vote and print a receipt for another, it's also just as easy for this to be displayed online.
since all votes (and images of each ballot) are published, and can be counted by independent individuals or organisations, (or the political parties individually themselves), and any individual can access an image of their vote to verify it matches, is that point not addressed? similar questions are raised in the comments section on that blog

also, does splitting the key into several parts not mean that no one individual or organisation can manipulate the system, without agreement of all parties?
 


New Threads

Popular Threads

Most Replies

Top